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Abstract. We addressed the question of optimality of private quantum channels. We
have shown that the Shannon entropy of the classical key necessary to securely transfer
the quantum information is lower bounded by the entropy exchange of the private
quantum channel E and von Neumann entropy of the ciphertext state ̺(0). Based
on these bounds we have shown that decomposition of private quantum channels into
orthogonal unitaries (if exists) is optimizing the entropy. For non-ancillary single qubit
PQC we have derived the optimal entropy for arbitrary set of plaintexts. In particular,
we have shown that except when the (closure of the) set of plaintexts contains all states,
one bit key is sufficient. We characterized and analyzed all the possible single qubit
private quantum channels for arbitrary set of plaintexts. For the set of plaintexts
consisting of all qubit states we have characterized all possible approximate private
quantum channels and we have derived the relation between the security parameter
and the corresponding minimal entropy.
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1. Introduction
Quantum cryptography [1, 2] (for a popular review see [3]) is a rapidly developing
branch of quantum information processing. The results of quantum cryptography
include quantum key distribution [4, 5], quantum secret sharing [6, 7], quantum oblivious
transfer [8, 9] and other cryptographic protocols [10]. Quantum cryptography has two
main goals: solutions to classical cryptographic primitives, and quantum cryptographic
primitives.
The first goal is to design solutions of cryptographic primitives, which achieve a
higher (provable) degree of security than their classical counterparts. The degree of
security should be better than the security of any known classical solution, or it should
be of the degree that is even not achievable by using classical information theory at all.
Another alternative is to design a solution which is more efficient (according to time,
space or communication complexity) than any classical solution of comparable security.
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The second class of cryptosystems is motivated by the evolution of applications
of quantum information processing, regardless whether their purpose is cryptographic,
communication complexity based or algorithmic. These cryptosystems are designed to
manipulate quantum information. As applications of quantum information processing
start to challenge a number of their classical counterparts, the need to secure quantum
communications in general is getting more urgent. Therefore, there is a large class of
quantum primitives which should secure quantum communication in the same way as
classical communication is secured. These primitives include encryption of quantum
information using both classical [11, 12, 13] and quantum key [14], authentication of
quantum information [15], secret sharing of quantum information [7, 16], quantum data
hiding [17] and even commitment to a quantum bit [2], oblivious transfer of quantum
information [2] and others.
In this paper we concentrate on private quantum channels (PQC), i.e. on schemes
for perfect encryption of quantum information using a pre-distributed classical key,
originally introduced in [11]. Our aim is to analyze the optimal encryption of an
arbitrary set of quantum states. In Section II we define the problem in general settings
and investigate the elementary properties of private quantum channels including their
optimality. Further, in Section III we focus on PQC for arbitrary set of qubit states. We
will restrict ourselves to encryption schemes without ancillas. The approximate private
quantum channels (APQC) for a single qubit are investigated in Section IV.
2. Private quantum channels and optimality
Consider a subset P ⊂ S(H) of quantum states. Its encryption is expressed by a
completely positive tracepreserving linear map E : B(H) → B(H ⊗ Hanc), where Hanc
describes some ancillary system and B(H) stands for the set of bounded linear operators.
The encryption consists of two steps: i) addition of an ancilla in the state ξ(j)anc and
ii) subsequent application of the unitary transformation Uj with the probability pj
satisfying the following identity
E [̺] =∑
j
pjUj(̺⊗ ξ(j)anc)U †j = ̺(0) (1)
for all states ̺ ∈ P. The triple [P, E , ̺(0)] satisfying Eq.(1) defines a private quantum
channel (PQC). This definition establishes a communication quantum channel for which
an eavesdropper gains no information by intercepting the transmitted messages. The
indistinguishability of different convex decomposition of the same state (̺(0)) guarantees
the security of PQC.
The secure communication via PQC is successful only if the sender and the receiver
share the same classical key (j1, . . . , jn) corresponding to the sequence of unitary
operations (Uj1, . . . , Ujn). The encryption as defined in Eq.1 can be viewed as a
noisy operation E caused by the environment interacting with the system and ancilla.
Consequently, the decryption depends on our ability to inverse such noise. Therefore,
only unitary decompositions of PQC channels are of interest [18, 19]. The decryption
Optimality of private quantum channels 3
itself is similarly like encryption composed of two steps: i) application of a unitary
operation according to shared classical key and ii) discarding of the ancilla. The size
of the classical key is quantified by its Shannon entropy (H = −∑j pj log2 pj) and our
aim is to address the question of the optimal encryption scheme that enables us securely
communicate an arbitrary set of qubit plaintexts P. The PQC with the smaller entropy
is better, because less amount of classical information must be distributed prior to secure
transmission of quantum states. The authors in [11] analyzed two cases: i) encryption of
all qubit states (optimal key H = 2), and ii) encryption of real superpositions (optimal
key H = 1), i.e. the equatorial plane in the Bloch sphere picture.
Before we get to a specific case of single qubit PQC let us introduce some
important notions and properties of private quantum channels. Due to linearity the PQC
transformation E encrypts not only the set P, but also arbitrary tracepreserving linear
combination of its elements, i.e. the whole set P tp = {̺ = ∑k qk̺k : such that ̺k ∈
P,∑k qk = 1, qk is real}. The set of operations U ′j = V Uj (V is unitary) forms a PQC
[P, E ′, ̺(0)′ ] (̺(0)′ = V ̺(0)V †), providing that the quadruple [P, E , ̺(0)] establishes a PQC
for the plaintexts in P. We note that ancilla states ξ(j)anc and probabilities pj remain the
same for both E ′, E .
In what follows we will restrict ourselves to PQC schemes using a fixed ancilla state,
i.e. ξ(j)anc = ̺anc for all j. Thus for PQC we have
E [̺] =∑
j
pjUj(̺⊗ ̺anc)U †j = ̺(0) . (2)
Such restricted definition was used in the original work [11] and it is sufficient for our
purposes, because in the next sections we will consider only PQC schemes without
ancillas. The general case deserves a deeper investigation, but it is beyond the scope
of this paper. Let us analyze the optimality for private quantum channels with a fixed
state of the ancilla.
The entropy exchange function Sex(̺, E) quantifies the amount of quantum
information lost in quantum environment due to interaction resulting in the
transformation E providing that the initial state of the system is ̺. In our case
the state ̺ describes the system together with the ancilla, because both of them
are transmitted via the quantum channel together. Due to Stinespring theorem each
quantum channel E can be expressed as a unitary transformation on a larger system, i.e.
E [̺] = TrenvG(̺⊗|0〉〈0|)G† = ∑j Aj̺A†j , where G is a unitary transformation describing
the interaction with the environment. The entropy exchange is defined as the von
Neumann entropy of the environment state after the interaction, i.e. Sex(̺, E) = S(ωenv)
with ωenv = Trsystem[G(̺ ⊗ |0〉〈0|)G†] = ∑jk Tr[Aj̺A†k]|j〉〈k|. This quantity does not
depend on particular Kraus representation, because different Kraus representations of
the same quantum channel are related by unitary transformation. Since PQCs are
always random unitary channels, it follows that ωenv =
∑
jk
√
pjpkTr[Uj̺U
†
k ]|j〉〈k|. From
the definition of von Neumann entropy [20] as the minimum of the Shannon entropy
over all projective measurements the following inequality holds S(ωenv) ≤ S(diagB[ωenv])
for arbitrary state ωenv. Thus, the equality is achieved if the basis B coincides with the
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eigenbasis of the density operator ωenv. The operation diagB cancels all off-diagonal
terms in the description of the density matrix in the basis B. In our case we have
S(diag[ωenv]) = H({pk}), i.e. entropy of the shared key equals to entropy of the diagonal
elements of the state ωenv. Hence, we obtain the following lower bound on the key
entropy
H({pk}) ≥ max
̺
Sex(̺, E) . (3)
The left side of this inequality does depend on the particular convex decomposition
of the quantum channel E , but the right hand side is independent of the particular
realization of E . Therefore, the smallest possible entropy of the key H is given by the
maximum of the entropy exchange. We have seen that this inequality is saturated only
if the environment state is diagonal, i.e. Tr[Uj̺U
†
k ] = 0 for j 6= k. Choosing ̺ ∼ I we
obtain the orthogonality condition for unitary transformations Uj , i.e. Tr[UjU
†
k ] = 0
for j 6= k. Thus, convex decompositions into orthogonal unitary transformations
saturates the above inequality. The right side is independent of the Kraus representation
(decomposition) of E and, moreover, for random unitary channels the maximum of Sex
is achieved for total mixture, because the diagonal elements are independent of the
state ̺, i.e. diag[ωenv] = diag[
∑
jk
√
pjpkTr(Uj̺U
†
k)|j〉〈k|] =
∑
j pj |j〉〈j| for all states
̺. As a result we have obtained that the optimal realization of PQC minimizing the
entropy of classical key is achieved for the encryption with mutually orthogonal unitary
transformations. Open question is whether such orthogonal decomposition exists for all
random unitary channels, or at least for all PQCs.
For a mixture of pure states ̺ =
∑
j pj|ψj〉〈ψj| the following inequality holds
S(̺) ≤ H({pj}). Consider a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ P tp. Encryption operation E results
in a mixture ̺(0) =
∑
j pj |ψj〉〈ψj | with |ψj〉 = Uj |ψ〉, i.e. we can use the entropy of the
state ̺(0) to bound the entropy of the key from below
H({pj}) ≥ S(̺(0)) . (4)
The previous lower bound in Eq.(3) determines the optimal value of the classical key
entropy for a given PQC E , but this bound enables us to limit the key entropy of PQC
based on the state ̺(0). This inequality suggests that the smaller the entropy of ̺(0),
the more optimal PQC could exist. For a given set of plaintexts this means that the
most optimal PQC should be the one with the purest possible state ̺(0). However,
this bound is not achievable in general. For instance, the encryption of all single qubit
states requires H = 2, but the entropy of the maximally mixed single qubit state is
S(̺(0) = 1
2
I) = 1.
3. Single qubit private quantum channels
In the previous section we have shown that the optimal realization of a fixed PQC
consists of orthogonal unitary transformations. However, the more general question is
the optimal PQC for a given set of plaintexts P. The first question is to specify the
states ̺(0) achievable by PQC. As we have argued at the end of the previous section the
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purer the state ̺(0), the smaller could be the entropy of the classical key. Using the fact
that arbitrary tracepreserving linear map cannot increase the trace distance between
two states (D(̺, σ) = Tr|̺− σ|) we obtain
δ = min
̺∈Ptp
D
(
̺⊗ ̺anc, 1
N
I
)
≥ D
(
̺(0),
1
N
I
)
, (5)
where N = dim(H⊗Hanc) is the dimension of the system together with the ancilla. This
inequality restricts the possible states ̺(0) to the δ vicinity around the total mixture 1
N
I,
but the achievability of all such states must be proved, see below.
3.1. Single qubit ancilla-free PQCs
The PQC channel is a special random unitary channel, hence it is unital (preserves the
total mixture 1
N
I). This feature makes it easy to analyze all PQC for a single qubit, i.e.
for two-dimensional quantum system, if we restrict ourselves to PQC without ancillas
(ancilla-free PQC). Under such condition the PQCs are just single qubit unital channels
that coincide with random unitary channels, i.e. each single qubit unital channel can be
expressed as a convex combination of unitary transformations [21]. In what follows we
will use the Bloch sphere representation of qubit states, i.e. as a three-dimensional real
vectors ~r specifying the state ̺ = 1
2
(I+~r ·~σ), where ~σ = (σx, σy, σz) is the vector of Pauli
operators. The unital quantum channels E correspond to Bloch vector transformations
~r → ~r′ = T~r, where T is a 3x3 real matrix with coefficients Tjk = Tr(σjE [σk]). Each
unital quantum channel can be written via two unitary transformations U, V and a
specific quantum channel ΦE in the following way E [̺] = UΦE [V †̺V ]U †. The operation
ΦE is just the convex combination of mutually orthogonal unitary transformations
(Pauli operators I, σx, σy, σz), i.e. ΦE [̺] =
∑
j pjσj̺σj . In Bloch sphere representation
this corresponds to the product of three matrices (singular value decomposition)
T = RUDRV , where RU , RV are the corresponding rotations of the Bloch sphere around
its origin and D = diag{λ1, λ2, λ3} is a diagonal matrix with λj being singular values of
the matrix T (for details see [21, 22]). They are related to the probabilities pj via the
following identities
px =
1
4
(1 + λ1 − λ2 − λ3)
py =
1
4
(1− λ1 + λ2 − λ3)
pz =
1
4
(1− λ1 − λ2 + λ3)
p0 = 1− px − py − pz .
(6)
To guarantee the positivity the parameters λ1, λ2, λ3 are constrained by the inequalities
pj ≥ 0.
In the previous section we have shown that orthogonal decompositions of a given
channel E are the optimal ones (in the sense of the key entropy). Moreover, the entropy
of the classical keys are the same for quantum channels E and ΦE (they are unitarily
equivalent). Therefore it is sufficient to analyze only the so-called Pauli channels ΦE , for
which the optimal realization is clearly a convex combination of Pauli unitary rotations.
Let us start with the specification of possible sets of plaintexts Ptp. The smallest
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possible set consists of a single plaintext (P1 = {̺}), but in this case the situation is
trivial, because there is nothing to hide. We remind us that the set of plaintexts is
publicly known. The largest possible set contains all qubit states, i.e. P4 = S(H). We
can meet with such case whenever the set P contains four (not only three!) mutually
independent quantum states (Bloch vectors). The mutual independence means that one
of them cannot be written as some tracepreserving linear combination of the others.
The tracepreserving linear combinations form a set covering the whole Bloch sphere, i.e.
Ptp = S(H). For this maximal possible set of plaintexts the optimal private quantum
channel is represented by the completely depolarizing channel mapping all states into
the total mixture, i.e. ΦE [̺] =
1
4
(̺ + σx̺σx + σy̺σy + σz̺σz) =
1
2
I for all ̺. Thus a
classical key of the length of two bits is necessary for the encryption of the whole Bloch
sphere, i.e. H = 2 [11].
Our aim is to investigate the minimal length of the classical key for other possible
sets of plaintexts P. In principle, there are only two remaining options: the set P tp is
generated either by two states (P2 = {̺1, ̺2}), or by three states (P3 = {̺1, ̺2, ̺3}).
The goal is to find the dependence of the key entropy on particular properties of these
generating states. In the Bloch sphere picture the sets P2tp and P3tp can be illustrated as
lines and planes, respectively, intersecting the Bloch sphere (for details see [22]). It is
known [11] that for the so-called real qubits, i.e. real superpositions of two orthogonal
pure states, only single bit is sufficient to establish a private quantum channel. Such
states form a particular set of plaintexts consisting of all equatorial states of the Bloch
sphere. Using this result we can conclude that there exists a private quantum channel
for arbitrary set P2tp with the entropy H = 1. This can be seen directly from the Bloch
sphere representation, because real superpositions form a circle containing the center of
the Bloch sphere, but each line associated with P2tp belongs to some plane containing
the total mixture. Therefore, the real qubit encryption PQC scheme works for all lines
belonging to the corresponding real qubit plane. However, it is not known whether for
a specific set of plaintexts (not containing the total mixture) we cannot do better and
establish a PQC with H < 1.
3.2. All ancilla-free PQCs
In what follows we will address the following question: which single qubit unital maps
constitute a PQC? Except the trivial case (P1), the set P tp contains at least two pure
states |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 ∈ P tp. The PQC maps these two states into the state ̺(0). Using the
Bloch sphere representation this means that ~r1 → ~r′1 = ~s and ~r2 → ~r′2 = ~s, where
~r1, ~r2 correspond to pure states, respectively, and ~s is associated with ̺
(0). Using the
explicit form of Pauli channels (ΦE ↔ D = diag{λx, λy, λz}) the identity ~r′1 − ~r′2 = ~0
results in the system of equations λj(r1j − r2j) = 0 for all components j = x, y, z. This
equalities holds only if λj = 0, or r1j = r2j. If none of the λs vanishes (λxλyλz 6= 0), then
necessarily ~r1 = ~r2, i.e. the states are identical. Therefore at least one of the λj must
vanish. Choose λz = 0. The complete positivity constraint [21] restricts the possible
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values of λx, λy so that the inequality |λx ± λy| ≤ 1 specifies all possible (non-ancillary)
single qubit private quantum channels, i.e. the general single qubit PQC is up to a
unitary rotation represented in its optimal form as follows:
E [̺] = 1
4
((1 + b)̺+ (1 + a)σx̺σx + (1− a)σy̺σy + (1− b)σz̺σz) (7)
such that a = λx − λy, b = λx + λy and complete positivity constraints |a| ≤ 1, |b| ≤ 1.
The (optimal) entropy of the classical key necessary for establishing the general PQC
channel equals
H(E) = 2− 1
4
[h(a) + h(b)] , (8)
where h(x) = (1 + x) log(1 + x) + (1− x) log(1− x).
3.3. Two linearly independent states
Consider a set of plaintexts Pxy = {̺z = 12(I + xσx + yσy + zσz)} with x, y fixed.
Each PQC given by D = diag(λx, λy, 0) enables us to transmit these sets securely. In
the Bloch sphere representation these sets form lines parallel to the line connecting the
poles of the Bloch sphere. Without loss of generality we can assume that sets Pxy are
the most general sets of type P2tp. Indeed, arbitrary set P2tp is just a unitarily rotated
set Pxy = {̺z = 12(I + xσx + yσy + zσz)} for some values x, y. In particular, given
a set P2 as a segment of the line l crossing the Bloch sphere, it is always possible to
choose the coordinate system in the following way: the x axis is given by the center of
the Bloch sphere (1
2
I) and the middle point of the segment of the line l (most mixed
state in P
2
tp), the y axis is perpendicular to the plane given by the whole line l and
the total mixture. This choice of the new coordinates corresponds to a unitary rotation
of the Pauli operators σj → Sj = UσjU †. In this basis the line is given by the states
̺z′ =
1
2
(I + x′Sx + z
′Sz) for some fixed x
′. For instance, the states in Pxy can be
transformed into this form by a suitable rotation around the z axis. Therefore, the
analysis of P2tp reduces to the analysis of this type of states. Using the expression for
the distance between an arbitrary state ̺ ↔ ~r and the total mixture D(̺, 1
2
I) = |~r| it
follows that the closest state from the general set of plaintexts Ptp is always the one
associated with the shortest Bloch vector. For the states of the form ̺z′ the minimum is
achieved for z′ = 0, i.e. for the state ̺min =
1
2
(I+x′Sx), for which D(̺min,
1
2
I) = δ = |x′|.
The solution for real qubits guarantees the existence of PQC with H = 1 and ̺(0) = 1
2
I
(i.e. δ = 0), but PQCs for other states ̺(0) are possible as well. Nevertheless, the
formula for the entropy for general PQC channel guarantees that H cannot be smaller
than one, i.e. H ≥ 1. Although we cannot improve the entropy rate for P2tp we are
still curious about the possibility ̺(0) = ̺min. A direct calculation gives us that the
encryption (1
2
, I)(1
2
, Sx) establishes a PQC with the desired property, i.e.
̺(0) =
1
2
(̺z′ + Sx̺z′Sx) =
1
2
(1 + x′Sx) = ̺min (9)
with the entropy of the key H = 1. In fact, arbitrary state within the sphere
|~r| ≤ δ = |x′| is achievable with the entropy H = 1.
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Figure 1. Optimal entropy as a function of the distance θ = D(̺(0), 12I) for arbitrary
set of plaintexts characterized by parameter δ = min
̺∈Ptp
D(̺, 12I). The upper line
describes the dependence for sets of plaintexts containing three independent states
(planes) and the lower (constant) line describes the situation for plaintexts containing
only two independent states (lines).
3.4. Three linearly independent states
The sets Px = {̺yz = 12(I + xσx + yσy + zσz)} for a fixed x and arbitrary y, z represent
up to unitary rotations the most general sets of plaintexts of the type P3tp, i.e. planes in
the Bloch sphere representation perpendicular to x axis. In this case not all PQC (up
to unitary rotation) are suitable, but only those, for which λy = λz = 0 and λx 6= 0.
This class of PQCs is more powerful, because it encrypts not only the sets P2tp, but also
the sets P3tp. These channels correspond to so-called phase damping channels, i.e. they
describe the most general pure decoherence processes [23]. Using a suitably rotated
PQC of this form (D = diag{λx, 0, 0}) we can encrypt any possible set P2tp and P3tp
with the entropy
H = 2− 1
2
[(1 + λx) log(1 + λx) + (1− λx) log(1− λx)] . (10)
It follows that the smallest possible value of the entropy is the same for both types
of sets and equals H = 1, i.e. except the plaintexts containing the whole set of states
Ptp = S(H), a single bit classical key is sufficient to establish a private quantum channel
transmitting all plaintexts ̺ ∈ P tp for arbitrary set P, for which P tp 6= S(H).
3.5. Optimality
The optimal value is achieved for λx = 1, i.e. the corresponding private quantum
channels are unitarily equivalent to
ΦoptE [̺] =
1
2
(̺+ σx̺σx) . (11)
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We have analyzed the achievability of states ̺(0) 6= 1
2
I for sets P2tp and the question
is whether the situation is similar as it was in the case of sets P3tp. In particular,
̺min =
1
2
(I + xσx) is the state with the smallest length of the Bloch vector among all
states in Px. Is it possible to design a PQC such that ̺(0) = ̺min? The answer is simple,
because the PQC given in Eq.(11) satisfies this property, i.e. ΦoptE [Px] = 12(I + xσx).
Since all other sets P3tp are just unitarily rotated sets Px, it follows that the states ̺min
are achievable in general. For a general PQC [P3tp, D = diag{λx, 0, 0}, ̺(0)] the allowed
states ̺(0) are inside the sphere determined by the condition |~r| ≤ δ. In particular,
D(̺(0), 1
2
I) = |λxx| = |ax| ≤ δ and the entropy H is given by formula in Eq.(10), i.e. it
increases as the distance D(̺(0), 1
2
I) is decreasing. Denote by θ the distance D(̺(0), 1
2
I).
Then for a given value of θ the corresponding PQC transformation isD = diag{θ/δ, 0, 0}.
As a result we have derived that the optimal entropy of the classical key for arbitrary
(two or three dimensional) set of plaintexts equals H = 1. Moreover, we have found
the dependence of the optimal entropy on the distance θ between the state ̺(0) and the
total mixture (see also Fig.1)
H(P2tp, θ) = 1 (12)
H(P3tp, θ) = 2−
1
2
[(1 + θ/δ) log(1 + θ/δ) + (1− θ/δ) log(1− θ/δ)] . (13)
4. Approximate private quantum channels
Approximate private quantum channels (APQC) generalize the ideal version in the
following sense. The quadruple [P, E , ̺anc, ǫ] constitutes an ǫ-private quantum channel
(ǫ-PQC), if
D(E [̺1 ⊗ ̺anc], E [̺2 ⊗ ̺anc]) ≤ ǫ (14)
for all ̺1, ̺2 ∈ P. As before, the encryption operation E consists of a mixture of unitary
transformations Uj applied with probabilities pj. Similarly, the decryption operation
is given by application of the inverse operations U †j according to a shared classical key
represented by the sequence of unitaries Uj1 , . . . , Ujn. In such generalization of PQC
the transmission is still perfect and ǫ quantifies the security of the protocol, i.e. the
distinguishability of the transferred states.
We are not going to discuss the problem of optimality for such generalization in
its full generality, but we will pay attention to encryption of the qubit states without
using any additional ancillas. The set of all approximate private quantum channels is a
specific subset of all random unitary channels determined by the value of ǫ. As we have
mentioned, arbitrary single qubit unital channel can be written as a convex combination
of unitary transformations and upto a unitary transformations the general unital qubit
channel E is specified by three parameters λx, λy, λz related to probabilities p0, px, py, pz
via the Eq.(6). The entropy achieves its optimal value (minimum) for the orthogonal
unitary decomposotion of E , hence it equals the entropy of this probability distribution,
H = −∑j pj log pj .
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It follows that each unital qubit channel establishes an ǫ-PQC, but we still need to
specify the particular value ǫ and then analyze the optimal entropy as a function of the
degree of privacy for different sets of plaintexts P. Let us analyze the case when the set
of plaintexts P consists of all quantum states, i.e. P equals Bloch sphere. For a given
PQC E (i.e. arbitrary unital channel) we have
ǫ = max
̺1,̺2∈S(H)
D(E [̺1], E [̺2]) = max
~r1,~r2
√∑
j
λ2j |r′1j − r′2j |2
= 2max{|λx|, |λy|, |λz|} ≡ 2λmax . (15)
Without loss of generality we can assume that |λx| ≤ |λy| ≤ |λz| = ǫ/2. Our aim is to
analyze and relate the functions ǫ = ǫ(λx, λy, λz) and H = H(λx, λy, λz). In particular
we are interested in two questions: i) given ǫ what is the optimal approximative PQC,
i.e. with the minimal entropy H , and ii) given the entropy H what is the most perfect
PQC, i.e. with the smallest ǫ.
Consider λz is fixed and |λx| ≤ |λy| ≤ |λz|, i.e. the security parameter ǫ = 2|λz| is
fixed. For unital single qubit channels the conditions of complete positivity (see Eq.(6))
read
1− λz ≥ ± (λx − λy)
1 + λz ≥ ± (λx + λy) . (16)
The values λx, λy, λz satisfying these conditions form a tetrahedron with vertices
associated with the orthogonal unitary transformations I, σx, σy, σz. Since these vertices
are unitarily related, the whole tetrahedron can be divided into four unitarily equivalent
parts containing channels with the same values of entropy. It follows that it is sufficient
to analyze only two regions (forming a particular single part): with strictly positive
values (λx, λy, λz ≥ 0) and with strictly negative values (λx, λy, λz ≤ 0).
Intuitively, the geometric picture suggests that the most optimal APQC should
shrink the Bloch sphere symmetrically, i.e. |λx| = |λy| = |λz| = λ. However, not for all
positive, or negative combinations of λx, λy, λz such transformation is associated with
some completely positive map, i.e. the probabilities pj in Eq.(6) are not positive. Let
us assume that λx = λy = λz = λ then
HI = 2− 1
4
[(1 + 3λ) log(1 + 3λ) + 3(1− λ) log(1− λ)] . (17)
However, the transformation is physical (and entropy makes sense) only if −1
3
≤ λ ≤
1. Using the relation ǫ = 2|λ| we obtain the dependence of the entropy on the
approximation (security) parameter ǫ (see Fig.2) for this class of channels. As we can see
from Fig.2 for smaller values of the security parameter ǫ the channels given by negative
values of λ are more optimal. Indeed, one can test numerically that these points are
optimal among all possible private quantum channels for ǫ ∈ [0, 2/3]. Let us note that
the point λ = −1/3 corresponds to the best physical approximation of the universal
NOT operation (given by unphysical values λx = λy = λz = −1). At this point the
entropy equals H = 1.585. In the interval 2/3 ≤ ǫ ≤ 0.958 the optimal entropy is
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Figure 2. The dependence of the entropy of the optimal key H for a given degree of
secrecy ǫ is depicted for all depolarizing channels characterized by λx = λy = λz =
λ ∈ [−1/3, 1].
constant because the optimal depolarizing channel is still the best approximation of the
universal NOT (λ = −1/3). After that interval the entropy decreases again until its
minimal value H = 0 is achieved (for ǫ = 2).
While the depolarizing channels are optimal in the region of channels with the
positive λs for each value of ǫ, in the negative region these channels are optimal only for
ǫ ∈ [0, 2/3], because for other values the “depolarizing” channels are not physical. Let us
remark that in the previous paragraph we have discussed the optimality for depolarizing
channels, but for ǫ > 2/3 these are no longer optimal. We have found numerically that
the channels parametrized as follows λz = −λ (also for λ ≥ 1/3) and λx = λy = −κ
(κ ≤ λ) are optimal. The inequalities (16) results in the bound κ ≤ (1 − λ)/2, which
is nontrivial only if λ > 1/3. In fact, only in this case the condition κ ≤ λ holds. The
minimal entropy for λ > 1/3 is achieved for κ = (1− λ)/2 when
HII =
1
2
[3 + λ− (1− λ) log(1− λ)− (1 + λ) log(1 + λ)] (18)
and ǫ = 2λ. For a given ǫ this function should be compared with the entropy for
depolarizing channel HI for λ ≥ 1/3. If |λ| = 0.4913 (ǫ = 0.9826) these two function
coincides, i.e. HI = HII .
We have found that the optimal entropy for a given value of the security parameter
is given by the following function (see Fig.3)
H =


H1(−ǫ) for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 2/3
H2(ǫ) for 2/3 ≤ ǫ ≤ 0.9826
H1(ǫ) for 0.9826 ≤ ǫ ≤ 2
, (19)
where H1(ǫ) = 2 − 14 [(1 + 32ǫ) log(1 − 32ǫ) + 3(1 − ǫ2) log(1 − ǫ2)] and H2(ǫ) = 12 [3 + ǫ2 −
(1− ǫ
2
) log(1− ǫ
2
)− (1+ ǫ
2
) log(1+ ǫ
2
)]. This function characterizes optimal approximate
private quantum channels for the encryption of the whole state space. To discuss the
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Figure 3. The optimal entropy of the key H with respect to the accuracy ǫ for a
single qubit aproximate private quantum channels. The optimal values are achieved
for depolarizing channels except the interval 2/3 ≤ ǫ ≤ 0.9826, when the optimal
APQC is given by phase damping channels.
optimality of APQC for general sets of plaintexts is beyond the scope of this paper.
The main obstacle is that the analysis cannot be reduced to some typical sets like it
was in the case of perfect PQC. Let us note that for APQC not all the tracepreserving
linear combination must be encrypted with the given security ǫ. Similar result for
approximatively private quantum channels has been derived also in Ref.[24], where also
the optimality for qubit was discussed using different methods and slightly different
definition of the security parameter ǫ.
5. Conclusion
For single qubits we have characterized and analyzed all possible ancilla-free private
quantum channels and all possible approximate private quantum channels. We have
shown that except the set of plaintexts P generating the whole set of states via
tracepreserving linear combinations, i.e. if P tp 6= S(H), for arbitrary set of plaintexts
one bit of classical key is sufficient to establish a private quantum channel. However, if
P tp = S(H) then two classical bits are necessary. In order to use single bit of key even
in such case, one should employ an unphysical operation - universal NOT (ENOT). The
encryption of single qubit based on the operations I, ENOT (with equal probabilities)
would map arbitrary input state into the total mixture ̺(0) = 1
2
(I[̺] + ENOT[̺]) =
1
2
(̺+ ̺⊥) = 1
2
I.
Except the results valid for single qubit private quantum channels we have derived
bound on the optimal entropy for arbitrarily system. In particular we have shown that
for PQC [P, E , ̺(0)] the entropy of the key cannot be smaller than the entropy exchange
H ≥ max̺ Sex(̺, E). We have also shown that for a given random unitary channel E the
decomposition into mutually orthogonal unitaries optimizes the entropy H . For qubits
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such decomposition always exists, but for larger dimensional systems its existence is an
open problem. Except extending the results to larger systems, it would be of interest to
perform similar analysis for private quantum channels involving the usage of ancilla in
its full generality, i.e. including ancilla. This opens a lot of new possibilities and some
improval is very likely to happen.
Acknowledgement
The work was supported by the project GACˇR GA201/01/0413. MZ acknowledges the
support of Slovak Academy of Sciences via the project CE-PI, APVT-123 and project
INTAS (04-77-7289). J.B. acknowledges support of the Hertha Firnberg ARC stipend
program and grant project GACˇR 201/06/P338.
References
[1] N.Gisin, G.Ribordy, W.Tittel, and H.Zbinden, Quantum Cryptography, Rev.Mod.Phys., quant-
ph/0101098
[2] J.Bouda, Encryption of quantum information and quantum cryptographic protocols, PhD thesis,
Faculty of Informatics, Masaryk university (Brno, 2004)
[3] D.Gottesman and H.K.Lo, From quantum cheating to quantum security, Physics Today 53,
November (2000)
[4] C.H.Bennett and G.Brassard, Quantum cryptography: public key distribution and coin tossing,
Proceedings of IEEE Int. conference on computers, systems and signal processing, Bangalore,
India, pp. 175-179 (1984)
[5] A.Ekert, Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem, Phys.Rev.Lett. 67, 661 (1991)
[6] M.Hillery, V.Buzˇek, and A. Berthiaume, Quantum secret sharing, Phys.Rev.A 59, 1829 (1999)
[7] R.Cleve, D.Gottesman, and H.K.Lo, How to share a quantum secret, Phys.Rev.Lett. 85, 648-651
(1999)
[8] C.H.Bennett, G.Brassard, C.Cre´peau, and M.H.Skubicziewska, Practical quantum oblivious
transfer, Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances
in Cryptography, pp. 351-366 (1991)
[9] C.Cre´peau, Quantum oblivious transfer, J.Mod.Opt. 41, 2445-2454 (1994)
[10] J.Gruska, Quantum Computing, (Osborne McGraw-Hill, 1999)
[11] A.Ambainis, M.Mosca, A.Tapp, and R.de Wolf, Private quantum channels, FOCS 2000, pp. 547-
553 (2000)
[12] P.O.Boykin and V.Roychowdhury, Optimal encryption of quantum bits, quant-ph/0003059
[13] J.Oppenheim and M.Horodecki, How to reuse a one-time pad and other notes on authentification,
encryption and protection of quantum information, quant-ph/0306161
[14] D.W.Leung, Quantum Vernam cipher, Quantum Information and Computation 2, 14-34 (2002)
[15] H.Barnum, C.Cre´peau, D.Gottesman, A.Smith, and A.Tapp, Authentification of quantum
messages, FOCS 2002 (2002), quant-ph/0205128
[16] D.Gottesman, On the theory of quantum secret sharing, Phys.Rev.A 61, 042311 (2000)
[17] D.P.Di Vincenzo, P.Hayden, and B.M.Terhal, Quantum data hiding, Found.Phys. 33, 1629-1647
(2003)
[18] M.Gregoratti, R.F.Werner, Quantum lost and found, quant-ph/0209025
[19] A.Nayak, P.Sen, Invertible quantum operations and perfect encryption of quantum states,
Quantum Information and Computation 7, No.1, 103-110 (2007)
[20] A.Perez, Quantum theory: concepts and methods, (Kluwer, 1999)
Optimality of private quantum channels 14
[21] M.B.Ruskai, S.Szarek, E.Werner, An Analysis of Completely-Positive Trace-Preserving Maps on
2x2 Matrices, Lin. Alg. Appl. 347, 159–187 (2002)
[22] J.Bouda and M.Ziman, Limits and restrictions of private quantum channel, quant-ph/0506107
(2005)
[23] M.Ziman, V.Buzˇek, All (qubit) decoherences: Complete characterization and physical
implementation, Phys.Rev.A 72, 022110 (2005)
[24] I.Kerenidis, D.Nagaj, On the optimality of quantum encryption schemes, J. Math. Phys. 47, 092102
(2006)
